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THE GOLDEN MEAN BETWEEN KURT & DAN:
A MODERATE READING OF THE NINTH
AMENDMENT
Randy E. Barnett

*

It is a great pleasure to be here today. I may not know much about
the Ninth Amendment, but the Drake Law School did put me up at the
Holiday Inn Express last night. Yesterday, I came from a conference at
Vanderbilt Law School called "The Neglected Justices." I hope it does not
reveal too much about my contrarian nature that two topics of particular
appeal to me are neglected Justices and ignored provisions of the
Constitution. And, while many of those Justices were rightly neglected, I
deny this is true of the Ninth Amendment or the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
When Mark Kende invited me to give the talk today, he suggested
that I take the opportunity to express my disagreement with Dan Farber's
view of the Ninth Amendment in his new book! and with Kurt Lash's view
of the Ninth Amendment in his recent articles.2 But when it came time to
give this talk, I decided that this was not going to be practical. Because
disagreements over the Ninth Amendment are so focused on historical
evidence, it is impossible to present this evidence orally in a persuasive
manner without putting all of you to sleep. So I decided to refocus my
remarks on a question that would be more feasible to address in the
allotted ten minutes: Why have the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment been overlooked?
Let me begin by identifying where the three of us agree about the
Ninth Amendment. We all agree that the Ninth Amendment is an
important part of the Constitution. We all agree that it has been unjustly
ignored. We all think that the Supreme Court should use the Ninth
Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University
Law Center.
1.
See DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE "SILENT"
NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AMERICANS DON'T KNOW
THEY HAVE (2007).
See Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83
2.
TEx. L. REV. 331 (2004); Kurt T. Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth
Amendment, 60 STAN. L. REv. 895 (2008).
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Amendment in adjudication. And we all agree that the Ninth and
Fourteenth Amendments protect individual rights. Finally, I think we all
agree that much of the Court's current jurisprudence in the Due Process
Clause area with respect to the federal government would be more
accurately characterized as Ninth Amendment doctrine as opposed to Due
Process Clause doctrine.
So what do we disagree about? First of all, Dan basically limits the
application of the Ninth Amendment to the unenumerated rights that the
Supreme Court has already recognized as fundamental under its Due
Process Clause fundamental rights doctrine, and not much beyond that. I
think that is a mistake. I think that the Supreme Court's fundamental
rights doctrine is fundamentally wrong.3 In fact, in some sense, it is
somewhat of a fraud on the public because the doctrine is so malleable that
it simply allows the Court to turn away unenumerated rights claims
whenever it wants to. I think that limiting the protection of the "rights
retained by the people" simply to the Due Process Clause rights that have
already been recognized is an overly constrained view of the Ninth
Amendment. I have a broader view of the Ninth Amendment. I think it
protects all of the liberties that are retained by the people-not a favored
few that are established as fundamental to the Court's satisfaction, which is
its current approach to the protection of liberties. I think that, under the
Ninth Amendment, all liberties should be equally protected. That is where
Dan and I disagree.
While Kurt accepts the proposition that the Ninth Amendment
protects unenumerated individual liberties-or natural rights-to these he
adds the protection of something like a collective right of the people in the
states, or majoritarian rights. He has a number of different formulations of
the extra rights he says are protected.4 I think this goes too far-Kurt adds
a kind of right to the meaning of the Ninth Amendment that was not within
its original meaning. To reconcile this debate, you would have to get into
the weeds of the evidence that he and I have been debating for several
years now, which is not practical to do here.
To relate my position to Dan and Kurt's, we have a Goldilocks
3.
(2008).
4.

See generally
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E.

Barnett,

Scrutiny Land,

106 MICH. L. REV. 1479

Randy E. Barnett, Kurt Lash's Majoritarian Difficulty: A Response to
60 STAN. L. REV. 937, 938-39
(2008) (discussing Lash's various versions of a collective right of the majority to govern
in the states).
See

a Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment,
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situation. Dan's view of the Ninth Amendment is too small. Kurt's view of
the Ninth Amendment is too big. My view of the Ninth Amendment, of
course, is just right: it recognizes all of the individual liberties of the
people; however, it does not recognize a collective right that goes beyond
that. Although I am abstaining from defending my interpretation or
critiquing theirs, I would like to give you some reason to accept my
approach as plausible.
As it happens, there is a single piece of evidence that powerfully
supports the individual natural rights interpretation of the Ninth
Amendment.
It is a quote by Representative Roger Sherman of
Connecticut. Sherman was on the Select Committee of the House of
Representatives to draft the Bill of Rights along with Representative James
Madison, who had offered the original proposal for a bill of rights in the
House. In Madison's proposal, the amendments were to be inserted in the
relevant portions of the text. Madison would literally have amended or
changed the Constitution by inserting new text in different places and
crossing out old text. Sherman has been credited with the idea of leaving
the original text intact and listing the amendments at the end. Apparently
to this end, Sherman formulated a list of proposed amendments that was
lost to historians until 1989 when it was discovered among Madison's
papers.
The second proposed amendment on Sherman's list has proved to be
of great importance in interpreting the Ninth Amendment, particularly
how it begins and ends. Here is how it starts: "The people have certain
natural rights which are retained by them when they enter into Society. . .
. "5 That is an unmistakable affirmation that the "rights retained by the
people" to which the Ninth Amendment refers are natural rights, and it
connects the terminology of "natural rights" with "retained" rights within
the very committee that proposed the Ninth Amendment. This single fact
has been instrumental in refuting claims that the Ninth Amendment was
not a reference to natural rights; after this piece of evidence was introduced
into the debates over the Ninth Amendment, it was difficult to make that
argument again. And neither Dan nor Kurt deny that the Ninth
Amendment refers to natural rights.
The middle portion of Sherman's second Amendment provides a
nonexclusive list of examples of the sorts of rights that were retained by the
people:
5.
Roger Sherman, Draft of the Bill of Rights, reprinted in THE RIGHTS
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE 351-52 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989) (emphasis added).
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Such are the rights of Conscience in matters of religion; of acquiring
property and of pursuing happiness & Safety; of Speaking, writing and
publishing their Sentiments with decency and freedom; of peaceably
assembling to consult their common good, and of applying to
Government by petition or remonstrance for redress of grievances.6

Each of these "natural rights" are individual rights rather than collective or
group rights, and each are also liberty rights-that is, each identifies a type
of action that individuals are entitled to take, rather than goods one is
entitled to receive.
Sherman's second amendment ends saying, "Of these rights therefore
they Shall not be deprived by the Government of the united States." 7 This
affirms that the natural rights retained by the people, whether enumerated
or not, shall not be violated by the government of the United States.
Sherman's second amendment is important, therefore, because it is a
direct affirmation of the existence of natural rights, which are defined as
individual liberty rights, and is a direct affirmation that these liberty rights
shall not be violated. The Ninth Amendment does not say this expressly.
The Ninth Amendment only says, "The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people."8 In other words, the Ninth Amendment expressly
says only that one cannot use the lack of enumeration to claim that a right
should not be protected; it is a response to a particular argument. But, as I
have contended elsewhere,9 the Ninth Amendment also implies, as part of
its original meaning, what is expressly affirmed in Sherman's proposal:
there are, in fact, natural rights and these rights shall not be denied or
disparaged.
Given the available evidence of its original meaning, why has the
Ninth Amendment been so neglected by the courts? There are two
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id.

at 35l.

Id.

U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
See Randy E. Barnett, The People or the State: Chisholm v. Georgia and
Popular Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 1729, 1748-50 (2007) (explaining the notion of
constitutional implicature as applied to the Ninth Amendment); see also Randy E.
Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional Assumptions, 103 Nw. U.
L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2009) (expanding on this analysis of constitutional
implicature); Lawrence Solum, Semantic Originalism (Ill. Pub. Law Research Paper
No. 07-24,2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracUd
=1120244.
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obvious reasons. First, the content of this Amendment seems too terribly
open-ended. It seems to give what Raoul Berger has called a "roving
commission" to judges to identify whatever rights they may like or may not
like.lO The same could be said about the Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. As Robert Bork famously asserted in his
confirmation hearings:
I do not think you can use the ninth amendment unless you know
something of what it means. For example, if you had an amendment
that says "Congress shall make no" and then there is an ink blot and
you cannot read the rest of it and that is the only copy you have, I do
not think the court can make up what might be under the ink blot if
you cannot read it. 11

By the way, Bork loved the ink blot metaphor so much that in his book The
Tempting of America, he switched it from the Ninth Amendment to the
Privileges or Immunities Clause.12 So both unenumerated rights clauses
got covered by ink blots at some point by Robert Bork.
Second, the Amendment is considered too radical.
If these
unenumerated rights are recognized and protected, some people think the
Amendment would have an extremely constraining effect on the exercise
of governmental powers, such that it might well do away with government
altogether. Moreover, we know that the Founders and the authors of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
want to do away with all government. Therefore, the Amendment cannot
mean what it appears to mean, because if it did, the consequences are too
severe.
Let me conclude these remarks by explaining briefly why these two
criticisms are unpersuasive. As for the first, the original meaning of the
rights to which these provisions refer is not so open ended as Berger, Bork,
and others have claimed. Historical research has provided ample evidence
10.
RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY THE JUDICIARY:
THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 293 (2d ed. Liberty Fund 1997)
(1977).
Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
11.
Court of the United States: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th
Congo 249 (1989).
12.
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 166 (1990) (In his discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Bork states, "A provision whose meaning cannot be ascertained is precisely like a
provision that is written in Sanskrit or is obliterated past deciphering by an ink blot.").
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for establishing the original public meaning of both provISIOns. My
research has shown that the "rights . .. retained by the people" in the Ninth
Amendment was a reference to natural, individual, liberty rights. I think in
the case of the Privileges or Immunities Clause they meant that, plus those
rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights that went beyond natural rights.
Michael Curtis's path-breaking scholarship established that the privileges
or immunities of citizens referred to in the Fourteenth Amendment
included the enumerated rights in the Bill of Rights, 13 and my research has
shown privileges or immunities also included the same unenumerated
natural rights referred to in the Ninth Amendment. 14 There is no ink blot
covering the historical evidence that establishes the original meaning of
these rights, privileges, or immunities. So Dan is wrong, I think, to limit
the scope of the Ninth Amendment and Privileges or Immunities Clause to
the unenumerated rights that the Supreme Court has recognized as
fundamental.
If it is true that these provisions refer to all liberties, does this make
the Ninth Amendment and Privileges or Immunities Clause too dangerous
for courts to use? Would the judicial protection of all liberties bring an end
to all government? I think the mistake here is to take a too absolutist view
of what it means to protect constitutional liberty. We do not, after all, take
so radical a view of the protection of an enumerated liberty when we are
talking about, for example, the natural right of freedom of speech, which
was included in the Bill of Rights.
Freedom of speech was considered by Madison and others to be a
natural right. How do we protect this enumerated right? Essentially, we
do so by putting the burden on the government to justify its laws as
necessary and proper when a law affects the liberty of speech. We do not
say that government may never prohibit speech, and we do not say that
government may never regulate the exercise of the right to speak. Instead,
we say that if it is going to prohibit speech, the government has to show
that the speech is in some sense wrongful-that the speech in some sense
violates the rights of other people. Defamatory speech, for example, meets
this test. Defamatory speech is prohibited, not regulated. And it is
prohibited on the theory that it is tortious-that is, it violates the rights of
other people. This is also true of fraudulent speech. Although most speech
is not wrongful, when speech wrongfully interferes with the rights of others,
13.
14.

MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE
RANDY

E.

BARNETT,

PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY

RESTORING

60-68 (2004).

THE

(1986).

LOST CONSTITUTION:

THE
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it can be banned.
Short of prohibition, speech and assembly may also be regulated by
what First Amendment doctrine calls time, place, and manner regulations.
As outraged as you all may be about the fact that the Ninth Amendment
has been ignored since its enactment, you cannot now go into the street
and block traffic without getting a parade permit from the City of Des
Moines. Why is that? If they meet constitutional muster, time, place, and
manner regulations prevent the rightful exercise of the rights of speech and
assembly from unduly interfering with the exercise of liberties by our
fellow citizens. But the existence of a constitutional right to free speech
requires that such regulations be scrutinized to ensure that they are not
unduly burdening speech of which the government disapproves
If we were to take essentially the same approach to all liberties that
we now use to approach the First Amendment's natural right of freedom of
speech, we would employ the same analysis of prohibitions and regulations
of liberty. First, it is completely appropriate to prohibit wrongful actions
that violate the rights of fellow citizens. The Ninth Amendment poses no
obstacle whatsoever to the prohibition of murder, rape, and armed
robbery. Actions that risk violating the rights of others can be regulated,
provided the government shows that the regulations really are truly
necessary to protecting the rights of others, and are not aimed at imposing
an undue burden on the rightful exercise of liberty.
To put this approach into context, consider the medical cannabis case
of Gonzalez v. Raich. After Angel Raich and Diane Monson lost their
Commerce Clause challenge to the Controlled Substances Act in the
Supreme Court in a six-to-three decision,15 the case was remanded to the
Ninth Circuit, where Angel renewed her Due Process Clause challenge.
This claim too was eventually denied.16 It may come as a surprise to many
of you to learn that all of this litigation was pre-trial. Angel and Diane
went all the way to the Supreme Court, but they never got their day in
court. Because of the Supreme Court decision, the federal government was
never required to present arguments and evidence about why it was
necessary to reach Diane Monson's backyard marijuana plants-which she
consumed on her own property-in order to exercise its power over
interstate commerce. Similarly, on remand, the government never had to
show why preventing Angel's caregivers-who grew the cannabis for her at
no charge-from supplying her with this cannabis was essential to a
15.
16.

Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005).
Id.; see Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 866 (9th Cir. 2007).
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broader regulatory scheme established by the Controlled Substances Act.
The Raich case casts light upon the dirty little secret of the Supreme
Court's fundamental rights jurisprudence: the courts may refuse to protect
any unenumerated liberty it does not want to protect simply by defining
the right with great specificity.17 In Raich, we claimed the unenumerated
right being violated was Angel's right to preserve her life; the court instead
accepted the government's claim that the right at issue was the right to use
cannabis for medical purposes. Because the circuit court then rejected this
narrow right as "fundamental," the government never had to come in and
justify what it did. Ever! It could just sit back and wait for us to lose. We
never got our day in court.
As with the freedom of speech and assembly, all it means to protect
the other liberties retained by the people is to put the government to its
proof. If a law really is a reasonable regulation of liberty that is necessary
to protect the rights of others, the government ought to be able to come
forth with a justification that is compelling enough to persuade government
judges-government-employed federal judges who get appointed for
political reasons-that its justifications are persuasive. In Raich, the
federal government did not want to have to do this and it never had to.
Now, in the Raich case itself, I barely mentioned the Ninth
Amendment in our brief before proceeding to argue the case in the context
of the Due Process Clause. A word for all you future litigators out there:
the Ninth Amendment is not something you can really argue in court.
That, in fact, is what makes it part of the "Lost Constitution" that my book
is about.18 But this is unfortunate for two reasons: First, current Due
Process Clause doctrine overly restricts the protection of unenumerated
rights. Second, resting the protection of unenumerated rights on the Due
Process Clause undermines the legitimacy of protecting any unenumerated
rights. Adopting the original meaning of both the Ninth Amendment and
Privileges or Immunities Clause, however, would provide a far sounder
basis to protect unenumerated rights. On this important point, Dan, Kurt
and Randy all agree.

17.
See Barnett, supra note 3, at 1488-93 ( explaining how the "Glucksberg
Two-Step" operates to give courts complete discretion to deny unenumerated rights
claims) .
18.
See BARNETT, supra note 14.

DISCUSSION
PROFESSOR MICHAEL KENT CURTIS: Yes, I have a Lochner
question for you, Randy. My question is, when is John Marshall Harlan's
approach in Lochner the correct approach? Harlan first recognizes liberty
of contract and then he says, well, we have all of these occupational disease
texts and all the problems with bakers and so on, and so the government
really does have a substantial interest here in regulating it. It is a liberty
that gets some heightened scrutiny. They've got to prove it. They've
proven it quite adequately. And, if that is the case, why do you suppose
that Pat Goodman and all these people in script cases, and all the rest did
such a miserable job?

First of all, I want to say that
Lochner is one of the finest cases ever decided by the Supreme Court, so it
just shows how much we disagree about Lochner. I will say this, when you
go back and read Lochner-the facts of Lochner-you should take a good
look at the Bakeshop Act. The Bakeshop Act, of which this one provision
was stricken down in Lochner, was a very detailed regulation of health and
safety in the baking industry. It regulated how high the ceilings had to be,
how much white wash you had to use, and how hot the environment could
be, the ventilation in bake shops. It was a health and safety regulation of
the bake shop industry and it was never seriously challenged. The
Bakeshop Act was assumed to be constitutional by the Supreme Court.
Only one small provision was ever challenged and that was the maximum
hours-worked provision, which said that the bakers could not work beyond
a certain number of hours. This was a pretty unusual law in the sense that
pretty much anybody else could work as many hours as they wanted to.
Law clerks and lawyers could work as many hours as they wanted, but
bakers could not.
PROFESSOR RANDY BARNETT:

There was a suspicion by the court that this really wasn't a health and
safety regulation. Harlan came forward with his opinion that these really
were not justifications that were necessarily presented to the court and they
suspected that this was really a siding by the New York Legislature with
one side-the labor group's side-of a labor dispute, and under current
due process law at the time, that was considered unconstitutional.
Essentially what you have in Lochner, and what you have Justice Marshall
arguing for in McCulloch, is that this is pretextual legislation. It's
legislation that is being offered under the pretext that it is a health and
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safety law, but it was actually passed under other motives. Now, they could
have been wrong about that, and if so, Lochner could have been wrongly
decided in that it really was a health and safety measure and could have
been upheld as a health and safety measure, but in that instance, it's not a
very threatening case. But I do think what Lochner represents is what
McCulloch, correctly understood, represents. In fact, John Marshall
defended his decision [in McCulloch] in anonymous letters posted by him
in newspapers, including the Alexandria Gazette, where he noted that if
the government passed legislation based on one valid reason, but they are
really trying to pass it for other reasons, then that legislation should be
struck down as invalid. That part of McCulloch usually gets cut out of
constitutional law case books because it ends up confusing students into
thinking that McCulloch actually means more than it does.
PROFESSOR DANIEL FARBER: I am interested in your efforts to
map the landscape here intellectually. Could you say something about
your views about liberty, and specifically about the Ninth Amendment and
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and how would you relate those to
Richard Epstein's? The reason I ask that is because I think Richard would
also think that the rest of the Bakeshop Act was unconstitutional because
the market can handle those aspects of health and safety as well. So, I
wonder how you see that issue.

PROFESSOR RANDY BARNETT: I have to confess ignorance in
that I don't know what Richard Epstein would think. Richard Epstein is
not an originalist, first of all, so he rarely ever talks about the original
meaning of any provision of the Constitution, and I have no idea what he
thinks about the Ninth Amendment or the Privileges or Immunities Clause
and how it would apply to the Lochner case, and so I have no idea how my
views would compare to his. I assume he is a smart guy and so he must
agree with me.

PROFESSOR KURT LASH:
One of the issues that is kind of
haunting everything we do here has to do with constrained discretion of
justices and whether or not we should constrain the discretion of justices
this idea of whether the Ninth Amendment is a roving commission for
justices to do whatever they like. It's not surprising then that Lochner
would come up, which is generally treated as an example of something that
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justices should never do. Ultimately, this whole Lochner period of
substantive due process comes to a substantial end at the time of the New
Deal, when the Supreme Court says it will no longer follow Lochner and it
will no longer enforce the unenumerated liberty to contract. Basically, we
are going to behave ourselves, and we are going to begin constructing a
limited analysis going forward of only protecting fundamental rights. One
of the reasons they say they are doing so-one of the reasons they are
going to save strict scrutiny only for fundamental rights and not as a
general analysis of legislative reasonableness-is because they believe they
are not justified in intruding into the political process except under
extraordinary conditions. Your analysis, however, says it is appropriate for
the justices to review the reasonableness of legislation, give people their
day in court, and give them the opportunity to challenge laws that are
affecting their liberty, even if it is not a fundamental right enumerated in
the Constitution. I'd like you to explore just a little more that, at the time
of the New Deal, the reason they put in these heightened levels of scrutiny
was to constrain the court. How would you answer critics that say, by
opening the door to judicial analysis of reasonableness, you really have
created a roving commission?
PROFESSOR RANDY BARNETT: The story of Lochner is a very
interesting one-the way that Lochner became vilified. It really wasn't that
controversial a case at the time; there were some editorials for and against
it. It became controversial because it was made an issue by many political
progressives that were opposing the Supreme Court, and it was made into
one of their items about judicial activism of the Court, and they used it to
ask for what they wanted-a more constrained Court. It became part of
the substantial wisdom that Michael agrees with that Lochner is one of the
worst cases ever decided by the Supreme Court, along with Dredd Scott as
examples of things that justices should never ever do.

Jerry Gunther had this great constitutional law case book that was
used in pretty much all constitutional law classes. When Griswold v.
Connecticut and Roe v. Wade were decided, he did something innovative:
he paired Lochner with Griswold and Roe v. Wade in his casebook. He
said "If you don't like Lochner, then how do you justify Griswold?" It
doesn't seem like such a different thing that the court was trying to do. I
wrote an essay years ago saying that because of what Gunther had done, he
sort of revived Lochner into a popular case again. Though Lochner may
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have been decided wrongly, it wasn't something terrible the Court was
trying to do, and it wasn't the end of the world. I got a letter from Jerry
Gunther after that, saying he was appalled by the article I wrote because
the whole point of him putting Lochner where he did was to undermine
Griswold and Roe; he did not want to revive Lochner, but it was an
unintended consequence via law professors, I think. Now you are taught
Lochner by your law professors with a strange cognitive dissonance going
on. You are taught that Lochner is one of the worst cases ever decided, but
you are not really told why it's so terrible, given the fact that Griswold and
Roe are done the way they are done. So, there is this kind of residual
antipathy that remains about Lochner, but the reasoning for such has all
but disappeared, and many people believe that substantive due process is
okay.
In answer to Kurt's question about the role of the judiciary: one of
the things that is really left unsaid about the New Deal decisions is that in
Carolene Products itself, the Court said that it would be a denial of due
process of law if a person could not go into court and challenge the
irrationality of a statue as applied to them, which is essentially substantive
due process. But they just put the burden on the individual to establish the
irrationality, rather than what I would do, which is put the burden on the
state to satisfy the rationality of it. It wasn't until the 1956 case of
Williamson v. Lee Optical, where the lower court had struck down the
provision as being unconstitutional and cited Carolene Products and the
New Deal cases, which say everybody has a right to go in and prove a law is
irrational. Then the majority, Justice Douglas, who wrote Griswold by the
way, said that the Court presumes these laws are rational; if we can go in
and find a reason why the legislature might have passed the law that might
be rational, then that makes it constitutional. We don't actually enter into
any factual inquiry as to whether they are rational or not.
The Golden Age of judicial restraint, which judicial conservatives
want a return to, turns out not to be the New Deal after all, but it turns out
to be this Golden Era between 1956 and 1965, when Griswold was decided.
There was a nine-year period in which the Court allegedly operated under
this doctrine of restraint that we want to go back to, but we don't actually
want to go back to the New Deal cases where they said you ought to be
able to go in and challenge the rationality, and obviously we don't want to
go back to after Griswold when you were allowed to challenge the
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rationality. It is true that when originalism became revived in the 1980s,
one of the reasons for reviving it was to constrain judges because the idea
was that judges were unconstrained. But the new originalism that is widely
accepted by most originalists today is not an enterprise in constraining
judges, but an enterprise in determining what the writing really means.
Sometimes that will constrain judges and sometimes that will empower
judges, and for the new originalists it would be as much activism to uphold
a law that violates the Constitution as it would be to strike down a law that
doesn't violate the Constitution. In either one, judges would be putting
what they like or don't like about the Constitution ahead of what the
Constitution actually requires.
PROFESSOR MAURA STRASSBERG: On the question of the
rights of the people, I wonder what each of the three of you think about the
Second Amendment, which uses the "rights of the people" language, and
whether your position on that is informed by the Ninth Amendment, and
what you understand Madison thought that meant?

PROFESSOR RANDY BARNETT: This gets us into the nuances of
the evidence which none of us can really grapple with, but I will just say
and I summarize this in response to Kurt's Stanford Law Review piece-if
you actually break down the first eight amendments, they are all individual
rights, including the Second Amendment. Even those that oppose the use
of the Second Amendment in the Heller case to try and strike down the
D.C. gun ban concede that it's an individual right. I went to the oral
arguments and Walter Dellinger conceded that it was an individual right,
but it was only to be used in the context of being a member of an organized
militia, so that it was a conditioned individual right. But everyone agrees
that it is an individual right. There really is only one provision in the first
eight amendments that protects a collective right, and that is the
Establishment Clause, which inferentially protects the rights of states to
have established religions by saying that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion .. . ." This says that they cannot
establish a religion at the national level and cannot make a law to
disestablish a religion at the state level. That is a state rights protective
provision-notice it is not put in terms of a right. It doesn't say the people
have a right to establish religion, it says "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion . ..." So, even in the one provision
that has an implication of protecting the rights of people who have an
established religion, it is not expressed in the language of a right at all.

